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Abstract
Since 1982, Southeast Asia has experienced almost annual ‘haze’ pollution, caused by 
smoke from grass, forest and peat fires mostly in Indonesia. The haze affects the health 
of some 75 million people and the economies of six ASEAN nations. It is the region’s first 
transboundary environmental crisis that ASEAN is attempting to address collectively. 
ASEAN level interaction is often guided by the ASEAN Way, and a common debate is 
whether these norms constrain states from interacting effectively at the regional level. This 
paper will address this debate using interviews and material compiled during fieldwork in 
Singapore. While Singapore was one of the first countries to propose a common regional 
approach to the haze, this paper will illustrate how Singapore has in fact been constrained 
by the ASEAN Way while engaging with Indonesia and ASEAN. This is reflected in terms of 
its behavior at the ASEAN forum, statements made, and actions taken. As a result, Singapore 
has often resorted to other means of engagement, like bilateral and track-two engagement. 
As Singapore is one of the major ‘victims’ in this equation, this paper serves as important 
piece of the broader puzzle of why haze management in ASEAN has been less than effective.
Keywords: ASEAN Way, Singapore, Indonesia, Transboundary Haze, Regional Cooperation.
Introduction
As early as mid-1972, the term ‘haze’ was used by Singaporeans as a general reference to 
the steadily increasing air pollution that was visible in the developing city, at the time mainly 
thought to be caused by local vehicle and factory fumes, and the burning of rubbish (Wee, 
1973). However, at the end of that year, Singapore experienced a drastic increase in visible 
pollution, which was later identified as Singapore’s first serious episode of transboundary 
haze. At its worse, Singaporeans in high-rise flats reported ‘white smoke’ drifting in through 
their windows (Gan, 1972). Following this, Singapore experienced serious haze episodes 
in 1982-1983, 1991, 1994, 1997-1998, 2002, 2006 and most recently in 2009 (Francesch-
Huidobro, 2008). This haze, that usually occurs during National Day season in Singapore (9 
August) often casts a dark pallor over that special day (Mulchand [S21], 2010). 
This paper will combine material obtained from Singaporean newspapers, publications 
by the Singaporean government, ASEAN and other agencies, and primary data from 
semi-structured interviews that I conducted with journalists, government officials, non-
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governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as fellow researchers of this field that are 
based in Singapore. I argue that while state actors act primarily in their national interests, 
states who are members of an international or regional community with a common ethos, 
like ASEAN, will be constrained by that community’s normative environment. These actors 
will therefore strategically use these community norms to justify or encourage certain 
activity towards fulfilling their national interests. 
Dr Euston Quah (2010) from the Economics Faculty at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological 
University that was interviewed for this paper, describes Singapore as having to ‘suffer twice’ 
from this transboundary haze. Singapore suffers in terms of citizen health and significant 
negative impact on the economy. As a small island state, Singapore is especially vulnerable 
to atmospheric pollution that can blanket the whole country at once. It then suffers again 
in assistance expenses incurred to Indonesia and ASEAN. In addition, unlike Malaysia 
which has substantial profitable investments in Indonesian oil palm plantations, Singapore’s 
plantation investments in Indonesia are negligible. Therefore, Singapore does not have any 
vested interests in the burning activities in these plantations that are the major cause of the 
haze as well. Singapore’s national interests lie primarily in its continued growth as a ‘clean 
and green’ global business hub and the well-being of its people. By these calculations, 
Singapore, even more than Malaysia and Indonesia, bears the brunt of the damage from the 
haze. This paper therefore aims to illustrate how Singapore has at different times either used 
norm-based arguments in pursuit of its national interests, or have had its strategic actions 
constrained by the community norms. 
Environmental Management Structure
The Ministry of the Environment (now known as the Ministry of Environment and 
Water Resources or MEWR) is the policy-making body for environmental matters in the 
Singaporean government, and holds primary responsibility over air quality in the country 
(Francesch-Huidobro, 2008). The Anti-Pollution Unit (APU), which was established earlier 
under the Prime Minister’s Office to ensure that economic growth and rapid industrialisation 
were not achieved at the expense of the environment, was merged with the MEWR and 
renamed as the Pollution Control Department (PCD) when the ministry was established in 
1972. 
In 2002, the National Environment Agency (NEA) was established as a statutory board under 
the MEWR, in charge of operations and the implementation of environmental policies. The 
Meteorological Service Division (MSD) is under the purview of the NEA, and is directly 
involved in haze monitoring (Francesch-Huidobro, 2008). The MSD is co-located with the 
ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre (ASMC), whose role was expanded to include 
the monitoring of fires and haze in 1997 (Woon, 2002). The haze episode of 2004 resulted 
in the formation of an Inter-Ministry Task Force on Haze (ITFH), chaired by MEWR and 
comprising representatives from other agencies like the MSD, Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MOHA), Ministry of Information, and Ministry of Health.
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 The Singapore Environment Council (SEC) is a government-initiated NGO that was re-
established in 1995 as an autonomous organization, and performs various coordinating and 
educational functions, and is an implementer of programmes approved by the MEWR. The 
Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) is an NGO that is involved in mainly 
environmental policy-related dialogue and research, and facilitating information across 
borders to other think-tanks in the region (Francesch-Huidobro, 2008). 
Over the years, the government of Singapore’s approach to the haze issue evolved into a 
multi-pronged strategy involving all these agencies. Singapore tackled the haze on three 
fronts. Firstly, the NEA and PCD, in collaboration with other agencies, introducing measures 
to lessen the negative health impact on society. Secondly, the MEWR in collaboration with 
ministries like the MOFA put into place efforts to collaborate both bilaterally and regionally 
with the Indonesian government to control the fires. Thirdly, the Singaporean government 
enlisted the help of the SEC and SIIA to encourage civil society and the international 
community to apply indirect pressure on the Indonesian government (Francesch-Huidobro, 
2008).
Identifying the Source
Because of its expertise in satellite technology and monitoring stations, Singapore early on 
had a better understanding of the nature of the haze compared to Malaysia and Indonesia 
(Lim [S13], 2010). Ever since the first serious episode in 1972, the Singapore Meteorological 
Service Department (MSD) speculated that the haze was probably caused by fires from 
Kalimantan and Sumatra in Indonesia, since the dust was coming from the south (Byramji, 
1972). Measurements of air quality samples of industrial smoke from Singapore factories 
confirmed that the source was external (Gan, 1972). The Indonesian fires were confirmed 
by satellite pictures and Singaporean air crews flying over the region. On the worst days, 
visibility was reduced from 20 kilometres to 0.6 kilometres, and the haze slowed ferry 
travel at Singapore’s Sentosa Island. The month of April 1983 was reported to be the haziest 
month in Singapore in 30 years.
Throughout the years, various responses were received by Singaporean authorities from 
Indonesia as way of explanation from the haze occurrences. During the 1972 episode, 
Indonesia first denied that there were fires in the Indonesian islands big enough to cast such 
a thick blanket of haze over Singapore Byramji. Change in wind direction blows away the 
haze., but later admitted that local shifting cultivation habits in Palembang, Sumatra, which 
required open burning, was the cause of the haze. In 1982 and 1983, Indonesia reported that 
thousands of hectares of forests in Kalimantan were reported to have accidentally caught 
fire as a result of the extreme heat during the dry season. The 1994 fires were reported to 
have been deliberately started for political reasons by people opposed to the government’s 
timber concession programmes (Hadhi, 1994). Other reasons that were given include fires 
started from carelessly disposed of cigarette stubs.
Still, Singaporean news reports claim that the fires in Indonesia were worse that the Indonesian 
government was prepared to admit. While initially believed to be caused primarily by small-
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scale farmers using the slash-and-burn method to clear land (Francesch-Huidobro, 2008), 
findings by the Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing (CRISP) of Singapore 
in 2004 showed that a majority of the fires in Riau, Sumatra stem from oil palm plantation 
burning, with only a little coming from primary forest (Geh, 2010). It is well known that 
there is substantial economic motivation to clear and prepare land for harvest by the much 
cheaper method of open burning (Lee, 2010).
These plantations fires were dubbed ‘annual burn-offs’ by the Singaporean media, and 
coincided with Indonesia’s targeted policy during that time of converting millions of 
hectares of forest into plantations (Francesch-Huidobro, 2008). The recent haze in 2009 was 
again linked to Indonesian government policy, with the reversal of a year-long moratorium 
of the use of peatland forests by palm oil companies (Soeriaatmadja, 2009). 
The Cost-Benefit Equation
Despite heightened public concern over the haze episodes in 1972, 1982-1983, and 1991, 
PCD spokespersons maintained that there was no need for public alarm over the situation. 
The reason given was because the haze was not photochemical in nature, and thus was not 
dangerous to health and did not increase pollution levels in Singapore.  The PCD declared 
that it was not dangerous to be outdoors Byramji. Change in wind direction blows away the 
haze. Reports in 1984 stated that the levels for all air pollutants in Singapore were generally 
within the World Health Organization (WHO) standards and the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) Primary Standards. The MEWR reported that eye irritation 
and a slight odour in the air was merely an indication of the origins of the haze; of smoke 
from fires.  
However, faced with increased reports of eye irritation and respiratory problems, and with 
the adoption of the Pollution Standards Index (PSI) system based on health indicators, 1994 
was the first year that the Singaporean government acknowledged that air pollution levels 
were dangerous to health. The PSI in September 1994 reached 124, rated ‘unhealthy’ on 
the PSI scale (Hadhi, 1994). At its worst, the PSI hit a record high of 226 in 1997 (‘very 
unhealthy’). 
Once the government acknowledged that the haze was a health risk, measures to lessen 
the health impact of the haze on the citizenry was quickly put into place. Based on the 
ITFH’s advice, the MEWR provided three-hourly PSI updates through television and radio 
media, which was later also made available on the NEA website (Lim, 2010) and via SMS. 
And even though domestic sources of haze were found to be insignificant, other sources of 
pollution were closely controlled, like raising penalties on smoky vehicles. The government 
also set up emergency medical centres in public housing estates (Francesch-Huidobro, 
2008), and initiated more academic research on the effect of haze on asthma and other 
respiratory functions (Liang, 2000). 
While the effect of the haze on citizen health was given substantial attention by the 
Singaporean government, journalists that covered the haze episodes in Singapore observed 
that the Singaporean government eventually became more focused on the economic impacts 
ht
tp
://
jis
.u
um
.e
du
.m
y
87
Addressing Transboundary Haze Through Asean: Singapore’s Normative Constraints
of the haze. As a country without any notable natural resources, Singapore’s ‘clean and 
green’ image is very closely linked to its continued development and attractiveness as a 
global business hub. Therefore, mitigating the haze was placed very high up on Singapore’s 
national interest priority list (Geh, 2010). 
Table 1
Total Economic Losses to Singapore During the 1997 Haze (Lower Bound)
Type of damage S$ Million USD Million Percentage
Health 6.00 4.00 6.20
Tourism 81.80 58.40 83.90
Airlines 9.70 6.90 9.90
Total damage cost 97.50 69.30 100.00
Azhar Ghani (2010), a former Indonesia Bureau Chief of the Straits Times that was 
interviewed, notes that government concern over the haze issue went into overdrive after 
1997, when the negative link between the haze and Singapore’s economy became clearer. 
Concerns were raised from both the public and government on how the haze had affected 
business and tourism in Singapore (Fernandez, 1997), with researchers confirming a loss 
of at least S$97.5m during the 1997 episode (See Table 1). In a study commissioned by 
the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), it was concluded that the tourism 
industry in Singapore suffered the heaviest financial losses, at least 84% of the total 
estimated losses of the year as a result of the haze. Airline losses take up almost 10%, with 
the remaining attributed to health costs (Hon, 1999).
A follow up study in 2006 put estimated losses at $79 million within just the first hazy 
month of the year, not least because of the forced closure of Changi airport (Ghani, 2010). 
Singapore was especially concerned in 2009 about the haze as hazy conditions could affect 
Singapore’s F1 race and the APEC Forum (Gunasingham, 2009a). The haze this time also 
caused a measurable 20% increase in the number of patients with haze-related problems. 
The Singapore-Indonesia Relationship
From the beginning, the haze in Singapore was regarded as a very political and sensitive 
issue. Singapore had a good prior working relationship with Indonesia, even at top leadership 
level, which it did not want to damage. There is high interdependence between the two 
countries, as Singapore is especially reliant on Indonesian foreign direct investment, and 
vice versa (Savage, 2010). 
However, the historical relationship between Indonesia and Singapore has been described as 
‘difficult’. Indonesia’s ongoing internal racial tensions had brought to surface a disturbing 
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anti-Chinese element which Singapore, as a Chinese-majority state, took personally (Smith, 
1999). Most significantly, the Indonesian president once called Singapore a ‘little red 
(Chinese) dot in a sea of (Muslim) green’, which was the first time an explicit statement 
was made out of an implicit understanding (Savage, 2010).
Singapore is also known to be relatively outspoken when commenting on Indonesia’s internal 
affairs. Indonesia never took kindly towards these occurrences. It responded coldly in 1998 
when Singapore Mentor Minister Lee Kuan Yew criticized then-Indonesian President 
Suharto’s choice of Jusuf Habibie for vice-president (this being the first direct criticism of 
Indonesia by the leader of another ASEAN country), and in 1999 when Singapore Prime 
Minister Goh Chook Tong called on Jakarta to hold elections that would be accepted as fair 
and legitimate by the Indonesian people (Katsumata, 2004). The Megawati government 
gave Singapore a taste of its own medicine when it responded to Singapore’s demand for 
stronger action against terrorist suspects taking shelter in Indonesia by citing Indonesia’s 
‘democratic political system’, which does not permit arbitrary arrests of the kind that 
Singapore’s International Security Act facilitates (Acharya, 2003).
Vague unresolved sovereignty issues also exist between the countries, involving the Riau 
islands of Batam and Bintan, located very close to Singapore. In the 1960s, Singapore 
government-linked companies invested heavily in these islands. Now, the islands are a 
peculiar hybrid of Indonesian-Singaporean social order. The Singapore government’s role 
in these islands have been raised as an election issue in Indonesia, and the islands stand to 
be set further apart from Jakarta by their inclusion in a Singapore-US free trade agreement 
in 2002, made possible by the lack of clear-cut rules on the limits of the Singaporean 
government’s involvement (Phelps, 2004). 
Despite these points of contention, relations between Singapore and Indonesia remain 
amicable. However, the recurring haze issue had added strain between the two countries. 
But as my Singaporean interviewees often observe, ‘you cannot choose your neighbours’, 
therefore ‘divorce’, or a total severance of ties is not an option no matter how serious the 
situation (Mulchand, 2010). Therefore the Singaporean government were relatively careful 
with its engagement with Indonesia over the issue, especially during the early years (Savage, 
2010).
From Quiet Tolerance to Voicing Out   
Since the first episode of the haze, there was significant public outcry and dissatisfaction 
over what was regarded as the lack of action from both the Singaporean and Indonesian 
governments in mitigating the haze (Geh, 2010). However, MEWR announced that there 
was  nothing it could do to prevent the haze at the time, as the source was not local. The 
MOHA Minister Wong Kan Seng reminded the public that it should not be too vocal when 
condemning Indonesia, as this was not in line with ASEAN norms and values. He stated that 
the Singaporean government had already been sufficiently assertive over the matter (Chua, 
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1997). Tay (1997), the NEA chairman also reminded the public that Indonesia’s territorial 
sovereignty must be respected and assistance must be rendered constructively and quietly, 
in accordance with the ASEAN Way. MEWR Minister Yeo Cheow Tong even commended 
President Suharto’s apology that came in 1997, saying that it was a welcome and much 
appreciated surprise; that showed the President’s sincere concerns about the ASEAN 
environment. The Minister stated that Singapore was encouraged by Jakarta’s urgency over 
the situation, citing President Suharto’s ban on land clearing as an example (Pereira, 1997).
As a result, Singaporeans felt victimised by the situation (Lim, 2010). They accused the 
government of prioritising ‘saving face’ of their neighbour, instead of focusing on the 
wellbeing of its citizens. As several journalists pointed out, everyone knew where the 
haze was coming from and why, but no one could openly write about it (Lee, 2010). An 
opposition MP also ridiculed this approach, saying that if the MEWR minister insists on 
being polite to the Indonesians, he should consider ‘telling them politely’ that Singapore 
would take them to the International Court (for compensation) if the haze problem remains 
unresolved (Francesch-Huidobro, 2008). This suggestion was thrown out (Chua, 1997), 
as Singaporean academicians admit that even though the Indonesian president’s apology 
signified the acceptance of moral responsibility by the Indonesian government, legal 
recourse with Indonesia was unlikely given present ASEAN realities (Tay, 1997).
However eventually, official statements began reflecting public sentiment, which some 
scholars identify as proof that Singapore chose to break away from the ASEAN norm of 
non-interference with regards to the haze issue (Lee, 2010). Simon Tay  (2007) of the NEA 
warned that the failure of the Indonesian government to take immediate action would result 
in the loss of credibility in Indonesian leadership on the regional and international level. 
The NEA and MOFA also often wrote directly to their counterparts in Indonesia to express 
concern over the worsening haze situation over the years. In 2003, Minister Lim later 
released a statement saying that Singapore was communicating with Malaysia and Brunei 
over haze issues, significantly excluding Indonesia from the list.
The Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong also expressed his disappointment 
directly to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in a letter in 2006, which was released to 
the press. The Indonesian president responded quickly to this letter with another apology to 
the governments of Singapore and Malaysia, ‘even though this was not an intentional act by 
Indonesia’ (Ghani, 2006). However, frustrated that these apologies were not translating into 
action (Sun, 2010), Singapore decided to host an emergency meeting between Singapore, 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand to discuss the haze and ‘put pressure on 
Indonesia’ (Ghani, 2006). This unilateral move angered Indonesia, and the very same day 
the Singaporean-sponsored meeting was announced, the Indonesian President announced 
that Indonesia would host the meeting instead (Ghani, 2010). 
As a way to further indirectly pressure and embarrass Indonesia, Singapore also invited 
Indonesian officials to attend its F1 race in 2009 to see how the haze had affected the 
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event. In 2010, the Singaporean Minister at the MEWR expressed his disappointment to the 
press that despite many reminders to the Indonesians to pay attention to the hotspots, they 
continue to recur. He said that if the situation worsens, Singapore may consider registering 
their concerns on stronger terms (Channel NewsAsia, 2010). Singaporean officials however 
tell how their colleagues in Indonesia would get visibly upset when Singapore expresses its 
displeasure in these ways.
Strategic Action
An international community is characterised by a common ethos and high interaction 
density, and Schimmelfennig argues that the community’s normative environment would 
have a constraining effect on strategic action (Schimmelfennig, 2002). Accordingly, as a 
founding member of ASEAN, Singapore’s interaction with other members of the grouping 
should be influenced by the community ethos; that of the ASEAN Way. As described in 
the previous section, there have been several instances where Singapore has put pressure 
and embarrassed Indonesian officials in attempt to encourage more positive action from 
Indonesia on haze mitigation. However, in accordance with the good neighbourliness norm 
of the region, Singapore largely placed higher priority on ‘helping’ rather than ‘shaming’ the 
Indonesian government over the fires (Francesch-Huidobro, 2008). 
Especially during the early years of the crisis, Singapore was eager to help and engage 
with Indonesia on haze mitigation under the ASEAN umbrella. Several of my interviewees 
pointed out that this was primarily because Singapore did not want to be the only country 
financing mitigation efforts. Singapore did not want to be ‘penalised’ by being singled out 
to provide assistance just because it was the most developed country in the ASEAN region. 
This mindset can be explained using Schimmelfennig’s theory that actors act strategically 
on the basis of individual specific policy interests (Schimmelfennig, 2003). Therefore, by 
Singaporean calculations, ASEAN level interaction at the time was most in line with its 
national interests, as it would mean that Singapore could share the burden of assistance 
among other ASEAN countries. 
Schimmelfennig argues that states will strategically use norm-based arguments in pursuit 
of its interests (Schimmelfennig, 2001), in this case, to effectively prevent a recurrence of 
the haze. Several of my interviewees also explain that Singapore felt that ASEAN was the 
best platform for Singapore to channel pressure and help to Indonesia, without seeming 
overly condescending (Lim, 2010; Tay, 2010). Since the ASEAN community ethos upholds 
the norms of mutual respect and non-interference, Singapore was able to provide assistance 
to Indonesia at the ASEAN level under the understanding that this assistance observed the 
ASEAN norms. Singapore had hoped that Indonesia would find this level of engagement 
the most agreeable.
However, Schimmelfennig notes that sometimes actors would prefer to deviate from the 
normative standard if it contradicts its interests too seriously (Schimmelfennig, 2001). 
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While Singapore understood that Indonesia suffered from capacity limitations (Quah, 
2010), it observed very little positive momentum from Indonesia as a result from ASEAN 
level engagement, especially with the slow takeoff of the Regional Haze Action Plan 
(RHAP) and the Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ATHP). As a result, Ghani 
(2010) observed a lot of unhappiness from Singaporean officials towards the Indonesian 
government at ASEAN level meetings. The officials in short felt that Singaporean interests 
were threatened. Primarily fuelled by the governmental stalemate over Indonesia’s non-
ratification of the ATHP, the Singaporean government began to work outside the regional 
framework, and put more emphasis on various alternative forms of engagement with 
Indonesia (Mulchand, 2010). 
The first of these were bilateral arrangements with Indonesia, which involved sending direct 
assistance, primarily in the form of equipment, to Indonesia, circumventing the regional 
agreements that were already in place at the time. The second strategy used by Singaporean 
was to engage with Indonesia on the civil society, or track-two level. The Singaporean 
government supported and encouraged transnational advocacy which was hoped to surpass 
Indonesian government gatekeepers, or at least to ensure that Singapore’s voice was 
heard through a less adversarial source.  The third strategy was to go directly to provoke 
Indonesian action through the international level; at the United Nations. This was the most 
controversial among the three strategies, and resulted in a cooling of relations between the 
countries. 
The adverse reactions of Indonesia towards these various strategies show proof of what 
Schimmelfennig calls the ‘community trap’ (Schimmelfennig, 2001), where Indonesia, 
even in at the bilateral or international level, expects Singapore to honour the ASEAN 
community norms, and felt it appropriate to react strongly when these norms were broken. 
As a result, it can be observed that Singapore’s forthcoming engagements with Indonesia, 
namely the Singapore-Jambi master plan which was a direct bilateral engagement involving 
direct cooperation between Singapore and an Indonesian province at sub-state level, was 
careful to observe the norms of the ASEAN, to appease Indonesia. This is in line with 
Schimmelfennig’s argument that actors may be forced to honour norm-based commitments 
in order to protect their credibility and reputation as neighbours in the larger community. 
The following sections illustrate the above discussion.
Regional Cooperation 
The Singaporean public and media frequently called for its government to initiate 
consultation and cooperation with Indonesia to address the haze since 1972. In addition, in 
a 1985 Workshop on Transboundary Pollution of Haze in ASEAN Countries, the Singapore 
country paper contained suggestions for various ASEAN-level projects to mitigate the haze. 
However, the Singaporean seeds of multilateral cooperation to address the haze were only 
sown in 1994, when Singapore realised that nothing further could be done at home to reduce 
the impact of the haze on the island. 
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The haze was then placed as a major item on the agenda of the Malaysia-Singapore Joint 
Committee on the Environment (MSJCE). At the meeting, the two countries agreed to 
submit a proposal to the Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment for a 
regional early warning system for monitoring the haze, since the haze was an issue in more 
than one country in the region. This proposal was subsequently adopted by ASEAN, and 
the alert system was activated for the first time in September 1995. However, substantial 
ASEAN level cooperation over the haze only began in 1997, when the ASEAN countries 
established the Regional Haze Action Plan. The RHAP also expanded the Singapore-based 
ASMC’s role to include haze monitoring (Yong, 2005), with Singapore bearing the running 
costs as a form of contribution to the region. 
Despite this, Singapore still felt the need for a more concrete regional agreement. The 
MOHA Minister was reported to have informally mooted the idea of a regional agreement 
on the haze in 1998, but openly expressed his disappointment that there was absolutely 
no support for it at the ASEAN level. He also stated that current regional agreements 
were disappointing (referring to the RHAP), as there were no provisions for penalties or 
compensation, and were just unenforceable statements of intent (The Straits Times, 1998).
After five years of negotiations, Minister Yeo’s wish for a regional agreement was 
fulfilled when in 2002 ASEAN environmental ministers signed the ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution (ATHP) (Ahmad, 2002). The Singaporean MEWR Minister 
at the time, Lim Swee Say, was optimistic of the treaty, saying that it was a clear expression 
of political will and commitment for partnership in ASEAN to prevent future occurrences 
of the haze (Pereira, 2002). Simon Tay (2007)was also optimistic, commenting that ASEAN 
signs very few treaties, so when a treaty is negotiated, all member countries would usually 
take it very seriously. To show its support for the ATHP, Singapore was the first to voluntarily 
offer a contribution of USD50,000 towards the ASEAN ATHP Haze Fund.
Dr Alan Tan (2010) of the National University of Singapore that was interviewed points out 
that the non-interference norm had infiltrated the ATHP; diluting it in hopes that Indonesia 
would ratify it. However, ratification from Indonesia did not immediately follow. While 
Singapore acknowledged that it is Indonesia’s sovereign right whether or not to ratify the 
treaty, Singaporean officials were baffled over Indonesia’s refusal because the agreement 
did not contain any punitive measures, and Indonesia would be able to benefit from this 
agreement as well  (Caballero-Anthony, 2010). Singapore on several occasions hosted the 
Indonesian Environment Minister and his staff at the island to speed up the process of 
ratification. And in 2006, Singapore and Malaysia issued a united statement calling for a 
more coordinated response from ASEAN on the annual haze problem. 
Simon Tay (2007) believes that Indonesia’s non-ratification at the parliamentary level is 
aimed outwards at Singapore and Malaysia. In negotiations, Singapore tends to bundle 
issues together and seek tradeoffs, and this may be why Indonesia had responded by linking 
issues like extradition to their ratification of the ATHP (Ghani, 2010). Singapore officials 
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were taken aback by these requests because these issues were not raised earlier at the 
formation stage of the ATHP. However the Singaporean officials note that they would be 
happy to discuss the inclusion of additional protocols to the ATHP, after Indonesia ratifies it. 
Bilateral Cooperation
As a result of the slow progress with the RHAP, MEWR Minister Yeo Cheow Tong 
announced in 1998 that Singapore would provide financial and technical help to Indonesia 
not only on the regional level, but on a bilateral basis as well (Nathan, 1998). Even though 
Singapore was aware that bilateral arrangements would mean that Singapore had to bear 
higher costs for engagements, Singapore hoped that bilateral-level projects would enable 
the issue to move forward faster on several counts. First, there would be fewer parties to 
be dealt with. Second, it was hoped that, existing outside the ASEAN framework, there 
projects would involve less cultural baggage, in the form of the ASEAN Way norms, that 
may stand in the way of effective cooperation (Quah, 2010). 
This year, bilateral cooperation between Singapore and Indonesia was put into action. Over 
the years, Singapore provided Indonesia with C-130 aircrafts for cloud seeding, satellite 
images of hot spots, hand-held global positioning systems (GPS) and laptop computers 
fitted with satellite communications hardware to the Indonesians (Fernandez, 1997). A 2002 
meeting between Singapore and Indonesia resulted in a bilateral agreement that involved 
Indonesian officials being brought to Singapore for training to interpret these satellite 
images. 
These pictures were reportedly made use of by Indonesia when planning ground operations 
to locate and control fires. It was reported however that this assistance was greeted with 
some displeasure on the Indonesian side, for portraying that Indonesia’s remote sensing 
officials were not getting credit for their own remote sensing efforts (Sim, 1997), and 
also with concerns that Singapore was trying to rob Indonesia of its right to development 
(Lim, 2010). Singaporean officials also reported instances where Indonesian officials had 
reminded them that they should at least be thankful to Indonesia for the oxygen that they 
were providing for Singapore. 
Singapore had also offered to assist in the form of table-top exercises to help farmers in 
land-clearing methods, as well as fire fighting assistance. However, Singaporean officials 
acknowledge that sending firefighters to Indonesian territory may be too sensitive, because 
these firefighters, like policemen and soldiers, could be perceived as an extension of the 
Singaporean state. The MOFA spokesperson reminded the public that it would be up to 
Indonesia on whether to accept Singapore’s assistance , and assistance would have to be 
under Indonesian terms (Channel NewsAsia, 2006). 
Track-Two Diplomacy
Faced with Indonesia’s less than favourable responses to Singapore’s regional and bilateral 
efforts, the Singaporean government attempted to use a non-official voice to express its 
views on the fires in Indonesia. This was done through a strong governmental support for 
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NGO initiatives on the matter, and even an outright request by the Singaporean government 
for local NGOs to intervene. With support from the government, the SEC and SIIA 
pioneered the civil-society centered ‘track-two diplomacy’, in the hopes that the Indonesian 
government would feel more at ease discussing the haze issue at this track-two level 
(Francesch-Huidobro, 2008). 
The SEC and SIIA jointly hosted the first International Policy Dialogue on the Southeast 
Asian Fires in June 1998, bringing together a good mix of representatives from international, 
regional and local NGOs, as well as business people and ASEAN and governmental 
representatives. The Singaporean government then proposed a meeting between Singaporean 
NGOs and the ASEAN Senior Officials for the Environment, where results of the dialogue 
were shared with the ASEAN ministers (Francesch-Huidobro, 2008).  
Following this, the SIIA continued to organize such dialogues, with several objectives. 
Firstly, it was hoped to allow for stronger involvement and criticism of the Indonesian 
regime by international NGOs. Second, since direct bilateral talks on haze and fires between 
governments may not always be possible, this task could be taken up by the local NGOs 
through these dialogues instead. Thirdly, since governments are usually averse to purely 
environmental advocacy and activism, these dialogues would instead promote action 
through intellectual policy exchanges and recommendations. The SIIA has been credited 
for ‘mainstreaming’ the haze in ASEAN (Lim, 2010). This is because NGOs have more of 
a ‘philanthropic; image as compared to government which may be motivated by national 
interests (Geh, 2010). The latest SIIA dialogue bringing together environmentalists, private 
sector leaders and academics in the region, was held in October 2010 (Cheam, 2010).
Government officials attending these dialogues usually do not give official statements 
or use the dialogue as a platform to grandstand government agenda, but instead uses the 
dialogues to gauge the sentiment of the region, which they will then take back to their senior 
officials as background knowledge to consider during policy-making. This way, it is hard 
to gauge the effectiveness of this track-two diplomacy, but Singaporean officials described 
these track-two dialogues as a ‘powerful pillar’ and were especially valuable for being able 
to bring to the table both government and ASEAN officials for open discussion without the 
diplomatic formalities (Lim, 2010).
Among the ‘sensitive’ issues that were able to be raised at these dialogues was the fact that 
President Sukarnoputri was not supportive of environmental issues, the lack of coordination 
and cooperation across different ministries and agencies in Indonesia, the problem of 
law enforcement, corruption and collusion between government agencies and private 
enterprises, and inequitable land tenure agreements that do not promote ownership, and 
thus responsibility, of land (Francesch-Huidobro, 2008).  
The United Nations Affair
Parallel to these efforts, Singapore had also been discussing in parliament about UN 
involvement in the haze matter since 1998 (Francesch-Huidobro, 2008). Things came to a 
head in 2006 when, in response to the statements of some Indonesian leaders that nothing 
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could be done about the haze except to wait for a change in weather conditions, Singapore’s 
charge d’affaires in New York responded by describing these remarks as ‘profoundly short-
sighted’ (Garekar, 2006). 
Diplomatic tensions ran high at the end of 2006, when Singapore raised the haze issue at the 
United Nations General Assembly, calling for a wider effort which included international 
expertise to tackle the problem in Indonesia. At the assembly, the Indonesian President 
expressed his displeasure by refusing to shake the hand of the Singaporean President 
(Ghani, 2010). 
Indonesia’s representative at the assembly, Adiyatwidi Adiwoso Asmady, stated the 
haze was a domestic problem and described the move as unforgivable and tantamount 
to interference in the domestic affairs and sovereignty of Indonesia. Asmady felt that 
Singapore misused ‘the UN forum in a frenzy of naming and shaming’. She suggested that 
there might have been ‘some malice’ behind Singapore’s actions, saying that Singapore 
should have honoured the outcomes of ASEAN meetings that had agreed to handle the issue 
bilaterally and at the ASEAN level. It expressed its unhappiness by summoning Singapore’s 
envoy to Jakarta, and boycotting a bilateral meeting on a special economic zone between the 
states. Indonesia also banned the export of Indonesian sand to Singapore, saying that sand 
mining in Indonesian islands had caused environmental degradation there. Jakarta favoured 
the problem to be dealt with on the ASEAN level alone, without worldwide assistance, as 
Indonesian experts felt that they had adequate expertise within ASEAN to do so. Jakarta 
felt that it was unfairly singled out as the ‘only’ culprit, and felt that Singapore’s move 
would also cost ASEAN’s credibility. Several of my interviewees explain that Indonesia 
sees ASEAN as the most comfortable ‘level of interference’ for Indonesia, as compared to 
the international level, mainly because of the non-interference norm that can be called into 
force when necessary (Koh, 2010). 
However Singapore defended its move, saying that it was not meant to shame Indonesia, 
but to mobilise the international support that was needed, as Singapore did not believe 
that the problem could be solved without international support. Singapore also pointed out 
that Article 2 of the ATHP specifically mentions that transboundary haze pollution should 
be prevented and monitored ‘through concerted national efforts and intensified regional 
and international cooperation’. The MEWR Minister said that it would take strong resolve 
from the Indonesian government to enforce their laws to prevent forest fires, with support 
from both ASEAN and the international community (Gunasingham, 2009b). It was also 
pointed out that the haze was an intrusion into the domestic environment of Singapore. It 
was noted that Singapore originally wanted to raise the issue as a joint ASEAN statement, 
but Indonesia was against the idea (Garekar, 2006).  
The following year in 2007, Singapore again raised the issue at the United Nations Climate 
Change Conference 2007 (COP 15), in Bali. Indonesia, the host country, was relatively 
more gracious about these comments this year. On the heels of these two diplomatic events, 
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Indonesia received dreaded remarks from the UN about their non-ratification in 2009. A top 
UN official stated at a conference in Singapore that Indonesia needed to ratify the ATHP 
to prove its commitment, political will and moral obligation in tackling climate change 
through fighting forest fires. The official derided Indonesia’s Forestry Minister’s comments 
that action would only be taken if its neighbours complained (The Straits Times, 2009). 
The Singapore-Jambi Project 
In 2006, Indonesia invited its ASEAN neighbours to ‘adopt’ its fire-prone districts as part of 
its national action plan against the haze. Singapore commended the move, stating that this 
type of direct bilateral assistance to the grassroots level was better than a blanket ASEAN 
plan, and that it shows Indonesia’s willingness to move forward on the issue (Lee, 2006). 
Singaporean officials feel that it would be easier and more expedient to achieve results 
on a bilateral level instead of a regional level (Lim, 2010). Singapore later committed to 
adopting the district of Jambi (McIndoe, 2006) (See Illustration 1) (PNPM-PSIEW, 2009). 
Illustration 1. Map of Jambi province. 
Singapore then conducted a fact-finding mission to the region and also hosted officials from 
Jambi for a bilateral workshop to put together the framework of the master plan (Selamat, 
2007). The letter of intent (LOI) for the Jambi master plan was presented to Indonesia in 
early 2007 (Ghani, 2007a). Based on Indonesia’s request, the master plan focused on Muaro 
Jambi, one of the nine regencies in the province. It sets out a two-year capacity-building 
strategy for land clearing without the use of fire, as well as the mitigation of peatland fires, 
with a focus on fire prevention. Under the master plan, Singapore would assist in funding, 
technical expertise, and assistance to implement seven specific programmes, if requested 
by Indonesia (National Environment Agency, 2009). In November 2007, Indonesia finally 
approved Singapore’s LOI for a Jambi master plan (Chow, 2008). 
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The Singaporean government was careful to point out that the Jambi provincial government 
would have ownership over the plan (Ghani, 2007a). And in line with the ASEAN value 
of non-interference, both central and local government approval has to be sought before 
the implementation of any collaborative projects (Sun, 2010). The emphasis on ownership 
was crucial as any suggestions of foreigners taking charge of Indonesia’s problems was a 
sensitive issue for Indonesia. Particularly sensitive was Singapore’s proposed plan to get 
international environmental bodies with expertise on peatland management to help Jambi 
(Ghani, 2007b). Several of my interviewees believe that Indonesia is using the norm of 
sovereignty to avoid having to open its doors to unwanted external scrutiny on their internal 
practises (Koh, 2010; Tan, 2010). Singapore’s MEWR minister acknowledged this concern, 
stating that one could not expect countries to act against its own interests (Tan, 2007). 
Sachindhanam of SEC (2010) pointed out during her interview that due to the nature of this 
collaboration, the success of the plan is essentially dependent on the Indonesian government. 
The governor of Jambi, Zulkifli Nurdin, was especially receptive to Singapore’s assistance. 
During project handover ceremonies, he echoed the president’s apology over the haze 
situation to Singapore, and expressed that he was looking forward to more collaboration 
programmes with Singapore (National Environment Agency, 2009). However, several of 
my interviewees note that it is difficult to determine if there was any follow through on the 
Indonesian side after the completion of these projects. They argue that this strategy of asking 
for more help from Singapore may be a way for the central and provincial governments to 
avoid having to take any real, internally motivated action. 
Singapore was heartened to be able to report that there were no fires in the Muaro Jambi 
area in 2009, where their bilateral programmes with the district was concentrated (Huang, 
2009). The MOFA Minister added that the ongoing bilateral cooperation, based on ‘genuine 
friendship and close relationship built up over the years between officials from both 
countries’ had helped reduce the haze problem since the bad episode in 2006 (Peh, 2006). 
Singapore hoped that other regional heads would be encouraged by what is happening 
between Jambi and Singapore, and put such programmes into place as well (Gunasingham, 
2009b). However, Singapore reminded Indonesia that the efforts in Jambi represent only 
a small part of a much larger challenge faced by Indonesia, which will require substantial 
political will from the Indonesian government (Koh, 2010). 
Conclusion
Singapore’s experience engaging with Indonesia on various levels over the haze has 
been a taxing one for both countries. Schimmelfennig argues that actors will often justify 
their interests on the basis of the community ethos, which he calls ‘rhetorical action’ 
(Schimmelfennig, 2003). Accordingly, several of my interviewees often feel that certain 
ASEAN norms, like sovereignty and non-interference, have empowered and emboldened 
Indonesia to defend and justify its non-cooperative actions or non-action over haze issues 
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(Ghani, 2010; Tay, 2010), even though these actions may have been motivated by national 
interests, and not primarily because it would be socially accepted to do so (Schimmelfennig, 
2003). However, Euston Quah of NTU (2010) warns that the Indonesian government may 
have underestimated the cost of goodwill among other ASEAN governments, especially of 
Singapore, as a result of the haze. 
The numerous haze episodes over the decades have had a lasting effect on the Singaporean 
people’s psyche. Singaporeans have come to realise that their small country is very vulnerable 
to its surrounding regional environment (Geh, 2010). A survey conducted recently by the 
SEC found that the majority of Singaporeans are acutely aware of how any internal action 
could have serious environmental effects its neighbouring countries. Researchers account 
this awareness due to the country’s experiences with Indonesia’s fires and the resulting 
haze. With the return of the haze in 2010, it remains to be seen if the continued strategic 
actions of Singapore, and Indonesia’s strategic responses, would play out negatively or 
positively for the regional environment. 
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